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(71) 
IS THE FTC PLAYING FAIR? THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN FTC 
V. WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE CORP. FURTHERS AGENCY’S DATA 
SECURITY EFFORTS BUT CREATES TENSION FOR SMALLER 
BUSINESSES 
ROBERT S. TURCHICK* 
“The United States . . . is basically the Wild West of privacy.”1 
I. EVOLVING THREATS: ESCALATING COSTS AND CONSUMER FEARS OVER 
DATA SECURITY & IDENTITY THEFT 
The collection and security of personal information impacts businesses in 
every market.2  Personal information is a beneficial resource, but it is also a target 
for hackers.3  Data breaches have risen in number from 157 in 2005 to 781 in 
 
 *   J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A., 
2012, The Pennsylvania State University.  I would like to thank my family for their tireless 
support and encouragement.  I would also like to thank the editors of the Villanova Law Review 
for their feedback on this Casebrief, especially Lauren Anthony, Marie Bussey-Garza, Melissa 
Ruth, Carina Meleca, John Lisman, Travis Dunkelberger, Marc Robertson, and Allison Sumi 
Crowe. 
1.  Joe Nocera, The Wild West of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/opinion/nocera-the-wild-west-of-privacy.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/5gyx-6b3d] (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barry Steinhardt, 
Founder, Friends of Privacy USA). 
2.  See, e.g., TJX Companies, The, Inc., In the Matter of, FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 
1, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/072-3055/tjx-companies-inc-
matter [https://perma.cc/29vb-n75f] (directing TJX Companies to implement comprehensive 
security program designed to protect confidentiality of personal information in response to data 
breaches occurring between July 2005 and February 2007); In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 
140 F.T.C. 465, 471 (2005) (directing BJ’s Wholesale Clubs to implement comprehensive 
security program designed to protect confidentiality of personal information in response to data 
breaches occurring between November 2003 and February 2004).  Despite the FTC’s urging, 
members of Congress are reluctant to rein in the data collection industry on which they 
increasingly rely to win elections.  See Evan Halper, Think Target and Home Depot Invade Your 
Privacy? Political Campaigns Might Be Worse, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2016), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/la-na-political-campaign-data-privacy-20160127-
story.html [https://perma.cc/6elx-ck2l] (positing that political campaigns may collect “more 
personal information on Americans than even the most aggressive retailers”); Rosalind S. 
Helderman, Anne Gearan, & John Wagner, DNC Penalizes Sanders Campaign for Improper 
Access of Clinton Voter Data, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dnc-sanders-campaign-improperly-accessed-
clinton-voter-data/2015/12/17/a2e2e14e-a522-11e5-b53d-972e2751f433_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/3jn4-85zq] (detailing theft of “master voter lists” from DNC). 
3.  See Kathryn F. Russo, Regulation of Companies’ Data Security Practices Under The 
FTC Act and California Unfair Competition Law, 23 COMPETITION: J. ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. 
L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 201, 201 (2014) (“Companies are collecting more sensitive personal 
information about consumers than ever before while hackers are devising new strategies to 
access this information.”); see also Drake Mann, Christopher L. Travis, & Don Lloyd Cook, 
Data Security and Privacy: More Than I.T., 50 ARKANSAS LAW. 14, 17 (2015) (“Before the 
recent onslaught of computer viruses and data breaches, perhaps no one could be faulted for not 
having anti-virus software or paying much attention to data security.  But now . . . their 
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2015, nearly a 500% increase.4  Businesses that suffer data breaches face a costly 
internal investigation, possible litigation, and reputational harm.5  As a result, 
corporate spending on data security swelled to $1.4 billion in 2014, and the 
average cost per breach in 2015 reached $6.53 million.6  American consumers are 
increasingly aware of data security threats, and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) reports that the most common complaints from consumers are identity 
theft and fraud.7  While criminal activity often defeats outdated security 
measures, poor business practices may also lead to unintentional misuse or loss 
of sensitive information.8  
Despite this clear threat, there is currently no uniform standard governing 
data security.9  The FTC has attempted to fill this void by filing enforcement 
actions against companies with inadequate data security practices.10  Using 
 
appearance on any computer is increasingly foreseeable.”). 
4.  Compare ITRC Breach Statistics 2005–2014, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/images/breach/2005to2015_20160828.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/sk2f-8tc4] (last visited Jan. 16, 2016), with ITRC Breach Reports-2015 Year 
End Totals, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC-Surveys-
Studies/2015databreaches.html [https://perma.cc/af2h-6a82] (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) 
(showing increase in number of data breaches). 
5.  See Christopher J. Cox & David R. Singh, Security Breach Notification Laws: Data 
Privacy Survey 2015, WEIL iii, 
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/1502084_security_breach_notification_broch_en_dig
ital_v2.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/xu6v-mqad] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (explaining 
potential fallout for companies that fail to protect personal information properly). 
6.  See Evan M. Wooten, The State of Data-Breach Litigation and Enforcement: Before 
the 2013 Mega Breaches and Beyond, 24 COMPETITION: J. ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. 
B. CAL. 229, 229 (2015) (“Corporate legal spending on data security in the United States 
increased from $1 billion in 2013 to $1.4 billion in 2014, and is expected to climb to $1.5 billion 
in 2015 . . . .”); see also 2015 Cost of Data Breach Study: United States, IBM & PONEMON 
INST. LLC (May 2015), 
http://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/se/en/sew03055usen/SEW03055USEN.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/b6vw-8c9d] (explaining “total average cost [of data breach in United States] 
rose to $6.53 million”). 
7.  See Kelly M. Jolley & Lindy L. Gunderson, Data Breach Liability and Notification: 
What Do You Need to Know?, 27 S.C. LAW. 44, 45 (2015) (citing Letter from Leslie Rutledge, 
Attorney Gen., Ark., et al., to Hon. Mitch McConnell, Senate Majority Leader, et al. (July 7, 
2015), http://www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/sign-on-
letter/Final%20NAAG%C20Data%C20Breach%C20Notification%Letter.pdf (discussing rise 
in identity theft, fraud, and consumer anxiety over last fifteen years)). 
8.  See generally An Executive Overview of Generally Accepted Privacy Principles, AM. 
INST. CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS., 
http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/InformationTechnology/Resources/Privacy/GenerallyAcc
eptedPrivacyPrinciples/DownloadableDocuments/10261378ExecOverviewGAPP.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/pgw8-s77m] (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) (stating unintentional data loss is 
likely to occur). 
9.  See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the 
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 254 (2011) (“A majority of privacy scholars and 
advocates . . . contends that the existing patchwork of U.S. regulation fails to ensure across-the-
board conformity with the standard measure of privacy protection . . . .”); Jolley & Gunderson, 
supra note 7, at 45 (noting states have implemented different laws). 
10.  See FTC Enforcement Actions, 3 E-COMMERCE & INTERNET L. 27.06 (2015) 
(describing FTC’s strategy of bringing enforcement actions).  The Federal Trade Commission 
Act enables the FTC to prevent “unfair or deceptive practices” by order, injunction, or 
2
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enforcement actions has serious implications for regulated businesses; these 
actions, unlike generally applicable regulations, are binding only on the parties 
involved.11  As a result, critics argue that only a “patchwork” of data security 
standards exist, and businesses do not have fair notice of how the FTC will apply 
the standards to their own practices.12  Furthermore, some question whether the 
FTC has the authority to enforce data security standards at all.13  Because the 
agency settles the majority of these cases, the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals were the first 
federal courts to address this issue in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.14  In 
Wyndham, the Third Circuit applied the “vagueness” standard of fair notice and 
held that the Wyndham Worldwide Corporation’s data security measures failed 
the FTC’s three-part test for unfair practices.15   
The Third Circuit’s holding in Wyndham is a win for consumers because it 
gives the FTC flexibility in pursuing evolving threats, while still requiring fair 
notice for businesses that collect personal information.16  Contrary to much of the 
current criticism, FTC data security efforts are neither indiscriminate nor 
 
rulemaking.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(b), 53(b), 57(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
11.  Compare Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 28 S. Ct. 708, 714 (1908) (holding due 
process affords interested parties opportunity to be heard when rights are affected by state action 
“commit[ed] to some subordinate body”), with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 
36 S. Ct. 141, 142 (1915) (holding political process is safeguard against generally applicable 
laws).  The Court put it best in Bi-Metallic, a seminal administrative law case: 
General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property 
of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be 
heard.  Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex 
society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule. 
Id.; see also Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 607 (2014) (stating consent decrees are more like contracts 
between agency and corporation than binding precedent). 
12.  See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 9, at 254 (discussing uncertainty due to lack 
of uniformity among privacy laws); Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Another Round 
in the Chamber: FTC Data Security Requirements and the Fair Notice Doctrine, 17 J. 
INTERNET L. 1, 29 (2013) (claiming formal rulemaking provides fair notice benefits that 
adjudication does not). 
13.  See Seth Northrop, Is Your Business Ready for FTC Oversight of Data Security?, 
PRIVACY ADVISOR (Sept. 21, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/is-your-business-ready-for-ftc-
oversight-of-data-security [https://perma.cc/mcr3-byu7] (stating question remained whether 
FTC could regulate data security practices despite broad authority under FTCA). 
14.  See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming 
district court); see also FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014), 
aff’d, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
15.  See Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 236 (providing holding of court). 
16.  See Gerald J. Ferguson & Alan L. Friel, Challenging FTC Regulation of Cyber-
Security After FTC v. Wyndham, DATA PRIVACY MONITOR (Nov. 4, 2015), 
https://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/cybersecurity/challenging-ftc-regulation-of-cyber-
security-after-ftc-v-wyndham [https://perma.cc/v34f-rrxf] (noting Wyndham decision is widely 
regarded as victory for agency); see also John K. Higgins, Court Bolsters FTC’s Authority to 
Regulate Cybersecurity, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/82496.html [https://perma.cc/yy36-k7w5] (“This is a 
significant victory for the FTC and American consumers.” (quoting Alan Butler, Senior 
Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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unpredictable.17  The agency’s choice to pursue individual enforcement actions 
enables it to respond to constantly-changing cyber threats.18  By issuing informal 
guidance and publicizing past enforcement actions, the FTC has provided 
sufficient notice that a company’s data security practices could be challenged as 
legally unfair.19  Still, while the Wyndham decision aids consumer protection, it 
raises the question of how smaller companies can keep up with data security 
developments and the FTC’s expectations without going bankrupt.20  This 
Casebrief offers advice to compliance officers and legal counsel in the Third 
Circuit on how to minimize FTC scrutiny in the wake of Wyndham. 
Part II discusses the Third Circuit’s articulation of the fair notice doctrine 
and the FTC’s brief history of enforcing data security standards.21  Part III 
discusses the background of Wyndham, the Third Circuit’s analysis, and why the 
decision is a victory for consumers, as well as the FTC.22  Part IV details the 
pressure that the vagueness standard places on small businesses that collect 
personal information and suggests basic steps they can pursue to mitigate FTC 
scrutiny.23  Part V concludes by stressing the importance of documenting efforts 
to maintain strong (and “fair”) data security practices.24 
II. ADVANCEMENTS IN JURISDICTION: FTC’S ROLE EVOLVES AFTER DIGITAL 
REVOLUTION, BUT OLD RULES STILL APPLY 
Before initiating enforcement actions, the FTC, like all agencies, must 
instruct entities collecting personal information on the standards to which they 
will be held.25  The broad scope of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 
(FTCA) allowed the FTC to emerge as the prominent privacy enforcer in the 
United States, outside of existing, industry-specific laws.26  The FTC has fulfilled 
 
17.  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 624 (“There have been hardly any noted 
instances of inconsistency, despite a sizeable number of practitioner commentators who have 
analyzed FTC cases.”). 
18.  See id. at 589 (noting enforcement allows agency to remain “adaptable in the face of 
technological change”). 
19.  See id. at 621 (noting complaints and settlements are made publicly available on 
FTC’s website). 
20.  See Blake Edwards, Big Law and Big Data: On What’s Legal and What’s Creepy, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/big-law-and-big-data-on-whats-legal-and-
whats-creepy [https://perma.cc/97j8-8yz4] (quoting Marc Roth, partner at Manatt, Phelps & 
Phillips, LLP, on challenges faced by small businesses due to FTC regulations). 
21.  See infra notes 25–93. 
22.  See infra notes 94–137. 
23.  See infra notes 138–153. 
24.  See infra notes 154–157. 
25.  See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (“A 
fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities must 
give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.”). 
26.  See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 9, at 284–85 (arguing “procedural breadth 
inherent in the FTC Act” allowed FTC “to play an increasingly important role” in developing 
online privacy norms); see also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 606 (asserting FTC has 
gradually gained authority over data security in last fifteen years); Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra 
note 12, at 18 (stating FTC has become predominant data security regulator in absence of 
comprehensive regulatory scheme).  However, the FTCA by no means foreshadowed the FTC’s 
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this role for more than a decade by issuing informal guidance and initiating 
individual enforcement actions against companies with “unfair” data security 
practices.27  This approach has been criticized for failing to give notice of what 
data security standards are required by law, and there are calls for uniform data 
security regulation.28  However, the FTC’s informal guidance and complaints and 
settlements stemming from unfair data security enforcement actions demonstrate 
the agency’s consistent expectations regarding data security practices.29 
A. Selecting a Firewall: The Third Circuit Enforces the Fair Notice Doctrine 
FTC enforcement actions allow the agency to keep pace with evolving 
threats, but these enforcement actions raise stronger fair notice concerns than 
would a formal regulation.30  Due process requires laws to give fair notice of what 
conduct is forbidden or required by the government.31  This doctrine extends to 
criminal and civil statutes, especially when penalties are imposed for violations.32  
 
transformation into the country’s most prominent privacy regulator.  See Interview by Vicki 
Jackson, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., with Joan Z. Bernstein, Dir., Bureau of Consumer 
Protection, FTC (May 1, 2000), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/women_trailblazers/bernstein_histori
cal_society_of_dc_circuit_interview_2.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/p9u2-73vn].  
Bernstein, who is now in private practice, offered a candid and intriguing perspective of the 
nascent FTC authority over cybersecurity: 
The one place where there were some very vigorous issues of jurisdiction was in the 
privacy area.  It didn’t quite fit into “deception or unfairness” for us to say, 
“Everybody out there ought to be required to protect people’s privacy.”  Didn’t quite 
fit the jurisdictional model.  If you said you were doing something and you didn’t do 
it, we could assert our authority, and we did, using traditional law enforcement.  But 
we couldn’t get to the other place.  There were internal discussions about how to 
handle it and from that came our concept of convening forums on privacy issues on 
the Internet very early and to articulate our program.  Then we did the first survey of 
what was happening to the personal privacy on the web sites, encouraging self-
regulation, the privacy issues are real hot right now. 
Id. 
27.  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 624, 627 (arguing “common law of privacy” 
has emerged from enforcement actions and informal agency activity). 
28.  See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 12, at 29 (arguing that regulating data security 
“through complaints and consent orders . . . creates ambiguity”). 
29.  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 624 (stating enforcement actions have 
created cognizable standards). 
30.  See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 12, at 19 (“An agency using enforcement 
conduct, rather than less adversarial methods, to define the contours of its broad discretion likely 
raises greater due process concerns.” (citing Martin v. Occupational Health and Review 
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 158 (1991)). 
31.  See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (holding 
fair notice is fundamental right of all persons); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 
(2008) (requiring fair notice to regulations); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 
162 (1972) (asserting all persons are owed notice of what behavior government requires of them 
or forbids); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 390 (1926) (claiming statutes must use 
words and phrases known well enough to enable persons to apply them correctly).   
32.  See Fox Television Stations, 132 S. Ct. at 2317–20; Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & 
Blaine H. Evanson, The Enduring and Universal Principle of “Fair Notice”, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 
193, 196–97 (2013) (noting fair notice applies to “corporate civil defendants facing imposition 
of civil penalties by regulatory agencies”). 
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Nevertheless, the fair notice requirement for civil statutes may be satisfied with 
a lower level of specificity because the consequences are less grave.33  The Third, 
Fourth, and Fifth Circuits invalidate civil statutes that regulate economic activity 
as void for vagueness only when the statute is “so vague as to be no rule or 
standard at all.”34  However, the Third Circuit has held a higher standard of 
notice—“ascertainable certainty”—is required when an agency, rather than a 
court, interprets the meaning of its own organic statute or regulation because of 
the high level of deference owed these interpretations.35 
Fair notice also requires standards to ensure the law’s enforcer does not act 
 
33.  See San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1135 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Lesser degrees 
of specificity are required to overcome a vagueness challenge in the civil context than in the 
criminal context, however, because the consequences in the criminal context are more severe.” 
(citing Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982)). 
34.  See, e.g., CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 632 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967)) (stating statute is invalid if it fails to give 
interested parties reasonable notice of what it requires); Mayes v. City of Dallas, 747 F.2d 323, 
324 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding detailed criteria set forth in regulation was valid under Fourteenth 
Amendment); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1062 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding 
legislature provided “adequate legislative direction” to city’s preservation commission to avoid 
due process violation). 
35.  See Sec’y of Labor v. Beverly Healthcare-Hillview, 541 F.3d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(noting approval of cases holding “ascertainable certainty” as fair notice standard when agency 
interprets its own regulation); Dravo Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 
613 F.2d 1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he Secretary as enforcer of the Act has the 
responsibility to state with ascertainable certainty what is meant by the standards he has 
promulgated.” (quoting Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 528 F.2d 645, 645–50 (5th Cir. 1976)); accord Nat’l Oilseed Processors Ass’n v. 
OSHA, 769 F.3d 1173, 1183–84 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (rejecting vagueness claim because words of 
regulation combined with public guidance from OSHA provided “ascertainable certainty” of 
standards); Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. E.P.A., 976 F.2d 2, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing Diamond 
Roofing Co., 528 F.2d at 649 (holding agencies have “responsibility” to delineate what 
standards are required by regulations with “ascertainable certainty”); Diamond Roofing Co., 
528 F.2d at 649 (holding regulation did not apply to “open-sided roofs” because OSHA failed 
to provide “ascertainable certainty” that it did).  In the Third Circuit, the “ascertainable 
certainty” standard is applicable only when: 
 (1) the agency had given conflicting public interpretations of the regulation or (2) 
the regulation is so vague that the ambiguity can only be resolved by deferring to the 
agency’s own interpretation . . . and the agency has failed to provide a sufficient, 
publicly accessible statement of that interpretation before the conduct in question.  
Beverly Healthcare-Hillview, 541 F.3d at 202 (quoting United States v. Lachman, 387 F.3d 42, 
57 (1st Cir. 2004)); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Judicial Discretion in Statutory 
Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (explaining agencies and judges interpret statutes 
differently).  Easterbrook notes that agencies are influenced by factors that do not reach the 
bench, such as political pressure and cost-benefit analyses.  See id.  Because courts will defer 
to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of their organic statutes and regulations in the absence 
of clear congressional direction, it is important to hold agency outputs to higher standards of 
fair notice in these contexts.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, 
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.”); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 451, 457 (1997) (holding Secretary of 
Labor’s reasonable interpretation of regulation denying exempt status to certain employees 
must be sustained where Congress had not addressed issue); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand 
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (holding that administrator’s construction of regulation is “of 
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous”). 
6
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arbitrarily.36  More serious fair notice concerns arise when an agency pursues its 
regulatory agenda by using enforcement actions instead of promulgating 
regulations because the standards will not necessarily consist of authoritative 
law.37  In this context, a court may assess the agency’s pre-enforcement activities 
to find that an agency provides fair notice of potential liability.38  This assessment 
primarily involves consulting administrative guidance, public statements, reports, 
and complaints and settlements stemming from enforcement actions.39  To raise 
public awareness and “conserve agency resources,” the FTC strategically files 
complaints against large companies with practices that are representative of 
industry standards.40  Subsequent settlements are made public in the Federal 
Register.41  These settlements are not legally binding to non-parties, but they are 
frequently treated as “adjudicated precedent” by other companies with similar 
practices.42 
B. Important Notification: The FTCA & Subsequent Congressional Action 
Suggest FTC Will Regulate Unfair Data Security Practices 
Far from precise, the FTCA gives the FTC broad discretion for determining 
what constitutes unfair commercial practices.43  Congress originally created a list 
of twenty unfair business practices, but omitted these restrictions from the 
 
36.  See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (asserting known 
standards must set bounds of enforcement). 
37.  See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 12, at 19 (“An agency using enforcement 
conduct, rather than less adversarial methods, to define the contours of its broad discretion likely 
raises greater due process concerns.” (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 158 (1991)). 
38.  See Gen. Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 53 F.3d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (explaining that 
“in many cases the agency’s pre-enforcement efforts to bring about compliance will provide 
adequate notice”); Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 12, at 20 (stating that informal agency 
outputs such as public statements, consent decrees, and policy statements may factor into fair 
notice analysis). 
39.  See Sarah Sargent, Fight or Comply: The Federal Trade Commission’s Power to 
Hold Companies Liable for Data Security Breaches, 41 J. CORP. L. 529, 539 (2015) 
(distinguishing guidance and reports from consent decrees). 
40.  See id. (citing Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 624). 
41.  See id. (noting both complaints and settlements are published in Federal Register). 
42.  See id. (citing Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 620).  
43.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).  The FTCA declares unlawful “[u]nfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”  See id.  The legislative history makes clear that Congress intended for the FTC to 
use its expertise to determine what constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice.  See S. REP. NO. 
63-597, at 13 (1914) (“The committee gave careful consideration . . . as to whether it 
would . . . define the many and variable unfair practices . . . or whether it would, by a general 
declaration condemning unfair practices, leave it to the commission to determine what practices 
were unfair.  It concluded that the latter course would be the better . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 63-
1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.) (“It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair 
practices.  There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field . . . .  If Congress were to adopt 
the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task.”); see also Eugene R. Baker & 
Daniel J. Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of 
Redefinition, 7 VILL. L. REV. 517, 518 (1962) (discussing broad scope of FTCA as intended by 
Congress). 
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statute.44  Congress reasoned that any number of activities could potentially be 
deemed unfair and feared that limiting the FTC’s ability to regulate novel 
practices would undermine the statute’s basic goal.45  Rather than consult a 
discrete list, the FTC uses a three-part test to determine if a commercial practice 
is unfair.46  Legally unfair practices are those that (1) cause or are likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers or competition, (2) could not have been 
reasonably avoided, and (3) are not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or businesses.47  The FTC determines the third factor using a cost-
benefit analysis that examines “the cost of available [tools],” the “size and 
complexity” of the company, and the nature of the business.48  Since 1980, the 
agency has openly used this power to strike down business methods in a variety 
of trades and services, from retail to entertainment.49  
Decades after the FTCA was passed, the FTC entered the data security field 
in response to domestic and foreign market pressures in the mid-1990s.50  
 
44.  See SEN. REP. NO. 63-597, at 13 (declining to define “unfair practices”); H.R. REP. 
NO. 63-1142, at 19 (noting constantly evolving practices that could potentially fit within 
definitional ambit of “unfair practices”). 
45.  See S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 13; H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (giving FTC room to 
combat unfair practices that had not yet been determined). 
46.  See Russo, supra note 3, at 202 (noting FTC uses three-part test for unfair practices).  
47.  See Letter from the FTC to Hon. Wendell Ford & Hon. John Danforth, Senate Comm. 
on Commerce, Sci., and Transp. (Dec. 17, 1980) [hereinafter 1980 Policy Statement].  The 1980 
Policy Statement, discussed at length in Wyndham, set the modern framework for legally unfair 
practices: 
To justify a finding of unfairness the injury must satisfy three tests.  [1] It must be 
substantial; [2] it must not be outweighed by any countervailing benefits to 
consumers or competition that the practice produces; and [3] it must be an injury that 
consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided. 
Id.  This test was subsequently endorsed by the FTC in enforcement actions.  See e.g., In re Int’l 
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 102 (1984).  This was a departure from previous interpretations 
of the FTC’s “unfairness” authority.  Cf. Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of 
Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (July 2, 
1964) [hereinafter 1964 Policy Statement].  The 1964 Policy Statement listed the following 
three factors as guiding an agency’s actions under the statute: (1) Whether, without being illegal, 
the practice “offends public policy” as established by statute, the common law, or other 
established notions of fairness; “(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or 
unscrupulous;” and “(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers [or businesses].”  See 
id.  Earlier cases focused on the second factor from the 1964 Policy Statement.  See, e.g., FTC 
v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 313-14 (1934) (stating “unscrupulous” and 
“unethical” behavior bolsters claim for unfair practices); FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 
(1920) (noting only practices that were “opposed to good morals” were designated unfair).  The 
Supreme Court held that the second factor could not be used as an independent basis for a 
finding of unfairness in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 241–42 (1972). 
48.  See Russo, supra note 3, at 202–03 (citing Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade 
Comm’n Before the Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-
federaltrade-commission-protecting-consumer-informationcandata-breaches-
be/140205databreaches.pdf) (explaining flexibility of third factor). 
49.  See 1980 Policy Statement, supra note 47; see also In re Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 149 
F.T.C. 1449 (2010) (applying three-part test to entertainment industry); In re DSW Inc., F.T.C. 
No. C-4157, 2006 WL 752215 (F.T.C. Mar. 7, 2006) (applying three-part test to shoe retail 
industry).  
50.  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 590 (discussing American public’s 
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Awareness and fear surrounding personal information-gathering strengthened as 
the digital revolution progressed in the new millennium.51  While Congress 
intended for the scope of “unfair practices” to be indefinite, the legislature has 
directed several agencies to regulate data security in specific industries such as 
healthcare, children’s websites, credit reporting, and financial services.52 
Of the these specific grants, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) and its 
related regulations provide the most stringent standards for data security, and they 
are often used by the FTC in settlements as a model for mandated compliance 
programs.53  The statute’s “safeguard” provision includes protection 
requirements for “customer records,” protecting against “anticipated [security] 
threats or hazards,” and preventing the “unauthorized access to . . . such [] 
information.”54  The FTC also directs financial institutions to designate at least 
one employee to coordinate an information program and identify reasonably 
foreseeable internal and external threats to the security and confidentiality of 
 
“reluctan[ce] to use the Internet out of fear that their data could be improperly accessed” in 
“mid-to-late 1990s”); see also Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 9, at 284–85 (2011) 
(explaining pressure on United States to improve data privacy laws after European Union passed 
Data Protection Directive in 1995).  The Data Protection Directive prohibited European 
companies from sending data to companies in nations with what the European Union deemed 
inadequate privacy laws.  See id. (citing Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31).  The 
Directive states that “personal data may only be transferred to parties in a third country if that 
country provides an ‘adequate level of protection.’”  Id. n.59 (citing Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 
O.J. (L 281) at 45).  As a result, data protection became a major trade issue for the Clinton 
administration, and U.S.-based multinational companies “feared the economic consequences” 
of lax privacy standards.  See id. at 283–85.  In response to these fears, the United States and 
European Union agreed to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles in 2000, which allowed U.S. 
companies to “self-certify” that their data security measures were “sufficient for trade with 
European partners.”  See id. at 285.  A significant caveat to this agreement was a mandate that 
the FTC “enforce privacy [policies]” that are claimed by American companies.  See id.  The 
agreement somewhat shielded the FTC from criticism that its burgeoning involvement in data 
security was “beyond its inherent authority.”  See id. at 285–86. 
51.  See Editorial Board, Op-Ed, Consumers Should Be Able to See the Data Companies 
Collect About Them, WASH. POST (May 31, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/consumers-should-be-able-to-see-the-data-
companies-collect-about-them/2014/05/31/82a821cc-e819-11e3-8f90-
73e071f3d637_story.html [https://perma.cc/cer7-kshq] (alluding to more invasive personal 
information collection by private sector as consequence of “digital revolution”). 
52.  See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. 105-277, § 1303, 112 
Stat. 2681, 2681 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6502) [hereinafter COPPA].  COPPA requires 
the operator of a children’s website to provide notice to users of what information is being 
collected and how it is used.  See id. § 6502(a)(1) (“It is unlawful for an operator of a website 
or online service directed to children . . . to collect personal information from a child in a 
manner that violates the regulations prescribed . . . .”); see also Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act, Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 216(a), 117 Stat. 1952, 198-86 (2003) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1681(w) (2012)) [hereinafter FACTA].  FACTA contains provisions to help reduce 
identity theft stemming from stolen credit reports.  See id. § 1681(w).  It directs the FTC and 
several other agencies to issue final regulations requiring credit reporting agencies to safely 
dispose of consumers’ credit information.  See id.; see also Proper Disposal of Consumer 
Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 35496 (June 24, 2004) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 682.3 (2016)). 
53.  See Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 501(b), 113 Stat. 1338, 1436–37 (1999) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012)); see also FTC Enforcement Actions, supra note 10 (noting similarity 
between GLB compliance and FTC data enforcement settlements). 
54.  See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012). 
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consumer information.55  At a minimum, this risk assessment should include 
consideration of existing “employee training and management . . . network and 
software design . . . information processing . . . and disposal[,] [] and detecting 
and preventing” foreseeable threats.56  The FTC also calls on financial institutions 
to “regularly test” and improve the effectiveness of their security procedures in 
response to new risks.57 
C. FTC Publicizes Data Security Standards & How It Will  
Respond to Unfair Practices 
A review of the FTC’s pre-enforcement activities gives companies fair 
notice that their data security standards may be challenged.  The FTC issued 
public statements on best privacy practices, even before its first unfair data 
security enforcement action.58  Although these statements do not have the force 
and effect of law, they present a strong case for fair notice when considered along 
with the FTC’s fifty-plus settlements since 2005.59  While not precise, FTC 
publications and allegations set forth in the FTC’s unfair data security complaints 
have been very consistent.60  These publicly available resources provide 
perceptive companies an outline for avoiding scrutiny.61 
1. Download Optional: FTC Offers Guidance, but Businesses Technically Are 
Not Obligated to Follow 
In 2003, former FTC Commissioner Orson Swindle testified before the 
House Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection Subcommittee regarding the 
importance of a “culture of security” in a computer-driven economy.62  In his 
 
55.  See Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 36493 (May 23, 
2002) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(a)–(b) (2016)) (listing elements of appropriate security 
program). 
56.  See 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(b).  At a minimum, the risk assessment should consider new 
employee training and management procedures.  See id. § 314.4(b)(1).  It should also consider 
new information systems.  See id. § 314.4(b)(2).  Finally, it must consider how threats are 
detected and prevented.  See id. § 314.4(b)(3). 
57.  See id. § 314.4(c) (requiring parties to “[d]esign and implement information 
safeguards to control the risks [they] identify through risk assessment, and regularly test or 
otherwise monitor the effectiveness of the safeguards’ key controls, systems, and procedures”). 
58.  See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 9, at 287 (including “best-practice” guidance 
in list of FTC’s important regulatory tools “outside the enforcement context”). 
59.  See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (explaining agency 
interpretations, such as guidelines, are not controlling law and deserve deference insofar as they 
reflect agency’s experience and informed judgment); see also Commission Statement Marking 
the FTC’s 50th Data Security Settlement, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 31, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140131gmrstatement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/llj2-5ewx] (discussing FTC’s fiftieth unfair data security practices 
settlement). 
60.  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 620 (stating FTC has been “consistent in 
[data security] practice” despite not being required to do so). 
61.  See id. (arguing “common law” of privacy provides guidance to regulating entities). 
62.  See Cybersecurity and Consumer Data: What’s at Risk for the Consumer?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on  Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, 108th Cong. 14 (2003) [hereinafter Cybersecurity and Consumer Data 
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statement, he said the reasonableness of safety measures should be determined 
by the nature of a company’s business, its size and complexity, and the sensitivity 
of the information it collects.63  Furthermore, Swindle recognized that breaches 
may occur even when all reasonable action has been taken and that not all 
breaches deserve punishment.64  He concluded by stating that security is an 
ongoing process that needs regular monitoring and reevaluation to keep pace with 
emerging technologies.65  Since these statements, the FTC has issued informal, 
but key guidance that has been a catalyst for businesses to implement stronger 
data security procedures.66 
Beginning in 2007, the FTC first published its expected standards for 
protecting sensitive data in Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for 
Business.67  While the FTC’s specific standards depend on the type and size of 
the business, the FTC calls on any office maintaining personal information to 
secure and dispose of it safely.68  The guidebook presents a checklist of smart 
security practices and encourages the development of training programs that 
educate employees who handle consumer data like “Social Security numbers, 
credit card [numbers],” financial account numbers, and other sensitive 
information.69  The FTC updated the guidebook in November of 2011 to reflect 
evolving practices.70  More recently, in June 2015, the FTC created a new 
framework known as Start with Security: A Guide for Business, which 
incorporates “lessons learned from FTC cases” with previous material.71  These 
pre-enforcement activities provide businesses with a roadmap for avoiding FTC 
 
Hearing] (statement of Orson Swindle, Federal Trade Comm’r, stating importance of 
compliance with data security standards); Protecting Info. Sec. & Preventing Identity Theft: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, & the 
Census of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (statement of Federal Trade 
Comm’r Orson Swindle). 
63.  See Cybersecurity and Consumer Data Hearing, supra note 62, at 8 (explaining cost-
benefit analysis involved in developing strong data security practices). 
64.  See id. at 3 (stating not all breaches deserve punishment, especially when company 
takes reasonable steps). 
65.  See id. at 12–13 (stating data security practices require constant reevaluation).  
66.  See FTC Enforcement Actions, supra note 10 (stating informal guidance has 
encouraged businesses to improve data security measures); Russo, supra note 3, at 201 (stating 
informal guidance has influenced businesses). 
67.  See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 256 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting 
guidebook has been available since 2007). 
68.  See id. at 256–57 (discussing checklist of best practices found in guidebook).  
69.  See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION: A 
GUIDE FOR BUSINESS (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-
0136_proteting-personal-information.pdf [https://perma.cc/q7qf-36xx] (listing examples of 
best practices). 
70.  See Kathleen Rice, Leita Walker & Mary Bono, FTC Releases Data Security Guide 
for Businesses, FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS (July 14, 2015), http://www.faegrebd.com/ftc-
releases-data-security-guide-for-businesses [https://perma.cc/t8vn-splq] (noting “latest FTC 
guidance builds on its 2007 brochure, Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business”). 
71.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS, 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM FTC CASES (2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/n4rh-8cn9] (examining various FTC data breach enforcement actions). 
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scrutiny.72 
2. Responding to Malware: The FTC’s Ex Ante Response to Unfair Security 
Measures Since 2005 
The prospect of an enforcement action looms large for a company that fails 
to follow administrative guidance.73  The FTC began by pursuing “deceptive” 
privacy statements, but, for over a decade, the agency has invoked its 
“unfairness” authority alone to challenge insufficient data security practices.74  
Companies can expect the FTC to pursue enforcement actions aggressively and 
require measures that are “reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances.”75  
When considering past enforcement actions, a core set of allegations emerges: 
failing to (1) install “readily available protections, such as firewalls[,] to limit 
access” to computer networks, (2) “[s]tore[] sensitive [] data” in encrypted form, 
(3) “remedy known security vulnerabilities,” (4) use complex “log-in 
credentials,” (5) “employ reasonable measures to detect and prevent [breaches],” 
(6) properly respond to security incidents, and (7) “restrict third-party access” to 
corporate networks adequately.76  Almost all cases have ended with settlements 
that require companies to establish a comprehensive security program and submit 
to third-party auditing “on a biannual basis . . . for a period of time ranging from 
[ten] to [twenty] years.”77  Notably, the FTC has made these settlements public, 
providing guidance to companies with similarly unfair practices.78 
 
72.  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 625–26 (noting FTC publishes guidelines 
with suggestions for best privacy practices). 
73.  See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 9, at 305, 310 (stating “threat of 
enforcement” is often necessary to effect “internal change” by regulated businesses). 
74.  See FTC Enforcement Actions, supra note 10 (noting FTC’s decade-long practice of 
challenging unfair data security practices); Russo, supra note 3, at 201 (discussing FTC’s 
practice of bringing enforcement actions); see also Ryan T. Bergsieker, Richard H. 
Cunningham, & Lindsey Young, The Federal Trade Commission’s Enforcement of Data 
Security Standards, 44 COLO. LAW. 39, 39–40 (2015) (explaining FTC’s move from 
challenging solely deceptive privacy practices to challenging insufficient practices as unfair). 
75.  See FTC Enforcement Actions, supra note 10 (arguing FTC will pursue enforcement 
actions); Russo, supra note 3, at 204 (suggesting FTC will “continue to aggressively pursue 
[enforcement] actions”); see also REUTERS, Obama Budget Proposal Includes $19 Billion for 
Cybersecurity, FORTUNE (Feb. 9, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/02/09/obama-budget-
cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/d8db-zwz4] (discussing President Obama’s Cybersecurity 
budget proposal).  President Obama has asked for a $5 billion increase in the federal 
government’s cybersecurity budget, calling cyber threats an “urgent danger[] to . . . national 
security”.  See id. 
76.  See Jason Straight, FTC v. Wyndham: “Naughty 9” Security Fails to Avoid, INFO. 
WEEK, http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/ftc-v-wyndham-naughty-9-security-
fails-to-avoid-/a/d-id/1322340 [https://perma.cc/9ku2-aege] (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (listing failures on part of companies obtained from FTC 
data security complaints).  While the main text mentions numerous “security fails,” there are 
even more potential security mistakes that may put companies at risk of facing an enforcement 
action.  See id. (detailing nine potential failures in protecting information). 
77.  See Russo, supra note 3, at 204 (noting prevalence of third-party auditing in data 
security settlements); see also FTC Enforcement Actions, supra note 10 (discussing common 
traits of FTC data security enforcement action settlements). 
78.  See FTC Enforcement Actions, supra note 10 (noting settlements are public); Russo, 
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After suffering a breach costing customers $14 million in fraudulent charges, 
BJ’s Wholesale Club (BJ’s) became the first company to have its data security 
practices challenged by the FTC solely on the basis of the agency’s unfairness 
authority.79  The FTC determined BJ’s failed to encrypt information stored on in-
store computers, “use readily available security measures,” use “sufficient 
measures to detect” and analyze security breaches, or encrypt information that 
could be accessed anonymously.80  The FTC concluded that these practices, when 
taken together, did not provide adequate protection to consumers.81  As a result, 
the FTC alleged BJ’s failure to employ sufficient security measures “cause[d] 
substantial injury to consumers that [was] not offset by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or competition and [was] not reasonably avoidable by consumers.”82  
BJ’s agreed to a settlement that included establishing an information security 
program and submitting to external auditing for a period of twenty years, closely 
mirroring the compliance requirements of Gramm-Leach-Bliley.83  Challenges to 
other companies such as DSW, TJX Companies, Dave & Buster’s, and GMR 
Transcription Services have resulted in similar settlements.84  
 
supra note 3, at 203 (noting FTC settlements disclosed to public).  
79.  See Consent Order, BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 476 (2005) (noting 
allegation of “substantial consumer injury” caused by breach); Lisa Jose Fales & Jennifer T. 
Mallon, The FTC’s Use of Its Unfairness Jurisdiction in Data Breach Cases: Is It Fair?, 
SECURE TIMES, at 2 (2006), https://www.venable.com/files/Publication/234eeda6-a32d-4dbd-
92c9-c463c8e4df99/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/52452d44-e6af-44ec-9709-
a534e3e9dcb3/1520.PDF [https://perma.cc/ty6w-pwje] (discussing BJ’s data breach). 
80.  See In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, 140 F.T.C. at 467 (discussing failures to protect 
private information).  The FTC alleged that BJ’s failed to use “reasonable and appropriate” 
measures to protect consumers’ information that was “collected at its stores.”  See id.  
“Beginning in late 2003 and early 2004, banks began discovering fraudulent purchases that 
were made using counterfeit copies of credit and debit cards the banks had issued to customers 
[that had been used at BJ’s].”  Id.  As a result, banks and customers had to cancel and re-issue/re-
order thousands of credit and debit cards.  See id. 
81.  See id. (discussing BJ’s data security measures pre-breach). 
82.  See id. at 468 (discussing BJ’s customers’ inability to avoid injury). 
83.  See id. at 471–73 (ordering BJ’s take certain measures to ensure future safety of 
customer information).  The steps required of BJ’s in the consent order are nearly identical to 
the regulation promulgated by the FTC in response to GLB.  Compare id., with 16 C.F.R. 
§ 314.4 (2016) (listing elements of sound “information security program”). 
84.  See Consent Order, In re DSW Inc., F.T.C. No. C-4157, 2006 WL 752215 (F.T.C. 
Mar. 7, 2006) (discussing unfair practices of DSW).  The FTC alleged that DSW engaged in 
multiple practices that, when taken together, constituted unfair practices.  See id. at 2.  Among 
other things, the FTC alleged that DSW 
(1) created unnecessary risks to the information by storing it in multiple files even 
when it [was no longer needed]; (2) did not use readily available security 
measures . . . ; (3) stored the information in unencrypted files . . . ; (4) did not limit 
sufficiently the ability of computers on one in-store network to connect to computers 
on other . . . networks; and (5) failed to employ sufficient measures to detect 
unauthorized access. 
Id.  “The breach compromised a total of approximately 1,438,281 credit and debit cards . . . as 
well as 96,385 checking accounts and driver’s license numbers.”  Id. at 3.  The Commission 
ordered DSW was required to set up a system for testing its security program and was forced to 
submit to external audits periodically over twenty years, similar to the consent order in In re 
BJ’s Wholesale Club.  See id. at 5.  TJ Maxx found itself in a similar situation just two years 
later.  See In re TJX Companies, Inc., F.T.C. No. C-4227, 2008 WL 3150421 (F.T.C. July 29, 
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More recently, the FTC challenged the security practices of LabMD, a 
cancer-testing laboratory.85  LabMD “conducted clinical laboratory tests on 
physical [specimens from patients]” and reported the results to the patients’ 
healthcare providers, and, in doing so, obtained a host of sensitive information.86  
The FTC alleged that, as a result of multiple LabMD security practices that were 
unfair, the personal information of 9,300 patients was stolen and made available 
in a public file-sharing network (LimeWire).87  The FTC filed an administrative 
complaint in August of 2013.88 
Rather than settle, LabMD decided to fight back.89  The administrative law 
 
2008).  The FTC alleged that information associated with tens of millions of unique payment 
cards was stolen as a result of TJX’s lax security measures.  See id. at *2.  Among its alleged 
failures, TJX 
(a) created an unnecessary risk to personal information by storing it on and 
transmitting it . . . in clear text, (b) did not use readily available security measures to 
limit wireless access to its networks, thereby allowing an intruder to connect 
wirelessly to in-store networks . . . (c) did not require network administrators and 
other users to use strong passwords or to use different passwords to access [] 
programs, computers, and networks, (d) failed to use . . . a firewall . . . ; and (e) failed 
to employ sufficient measures to detect and prevent unauthorized access to computer 
networks. 
Id.  TJX was ordered to establish a security program and submit to external auditing for twenty 
years.  See id.; see also In re GMR Transcription Servs., Inc., F.T.C. No. C-4482, 2014 WL 
4252393 (F.T.C. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding GMR liable for unfair practices similar to those 
conducted by TJX); Consent Order In re Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 149 F.T.C. 1449 (2010) (same). 
85.  See generally Complaint, In re LabMD Inc., F.T.C. No. 9357, 2013 WL 5232775 
(F.T.C. Aug. 29, 2013) (alleging unfair data security practices by Georgia-based cancer research 
clinic). 
86.  See id. at *1–2 (discussing nature of LabMD’s business). 
87.  See id. at *2 (discussing unfair practices).  The FTC alleged that LabMD engaged in 
unfair practices because it: 
(a) did not develop, implement, or maintain a comprehensive information security 
program to protect consumers’ personal information . . . ; (b) did not use readily 
available measures to identify [problems] . . . ; (c) did not . . . prevent employees 
from accessing personal information not needed to perform their jobs; (d) did not 
adequately train employees to safeguard personal information; (e) did not require 
employees, or other users with remote access to the networks, to use common 
authentication-related security measures . . . ; and (f) did not maintain and update 
operating systems of computers and other devices on its networks. 
Id. at *3.  The LabMD case is the most alarming FTC enforcement action brought under the 
FTCA’s unfairness provision because “LabMD had never been [accused of] a HIPAA 
violation.”  See Cheryl Conner, When the Government Closes Your Business, FORBES, (Feb. 1, 
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2014/02/01/when-the-government-
closes-your-business/#425c908a3652 (providing example of FTC regulating security 
procedures).  The actual breach seems much less dramatic than the systemic failure alleged in 
the FTC’s complaint.  See id.  An employee downloaded the public file-sharing program 
LimeWire to a work computer, and the sensitive information preserved by LabMD migrated to 
publicly accessible forums by way of LimeWire’s “peer sharing protocol.”  See id.  A simple 
policy of not downloading peer-to-peer file-sharing programs to work computers could have 
prevented this particular breach.  See id.  However, this Casebrief does not aim to trivialize the 
LabMD breach, which should have been avoided, and the author is aware that the hypothesized 
policy might be ineffective without sensible security measures.  For a discussion on some of the 
steps businesses may take to improve data security, see infra notes 142–57. 
88.  See Complaint, 2013 WL 5232775, at *3 (alleging unfair data security practices). 
89.  See Respondent LabMD’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint with Prejudice and to Stay 
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judge (ALJ) applied the three-factor unfairness test to LabMD’s practices and 
dismissed the complaint without making a legal conclusion regarding the FTC’s 
jurisdiction.90  The FTC, which based its theory of injury solely on patients’ 
embarrassment, failed to show tangible injuries.91  Absent a showing of 
probability of other harms, the ALJ determined that the FTC failed to show 
LabMD’s practices would “[cause] or [were] likely to cause substantial injury.”92  
This result came too late for LabMD; the company closed in 2014 due to litigation 
costs and the financial burden of the FTC’s prospective compliance program.93 
III. THE CASE IN BRIEF: FTC V. WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE 
A. Background & Procedure 
The Wyndham Worldwide (Wyndham) franchise operates hotels and “sells 
timeshares through three subsidiaries” around the world.94  It has “licensed its 
brand name to approximately [ninety] independently owned hotels” and requires 
each hotel to have “a property management system that processes [customer] 
information.”95  These systems are “configured” to Wyndham’s custom 
 
Administrative Proceedings at 18, In re LabMD Inc., F.T.C. No. 9357 (F.T.C. Nov. 12, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/131112respondlabmdmodiscomplaint
datyadminproceed.pdf [https://perma.cc/w5ne-efdv] (arguing that, because Congress gave 
specific grants of data security jurisdiction elsewhere, FTC lacks power to regulate data security 
through unfairness power). 
90.  See Initial Decision by D. Michael Chappell, Chief Admin. Law Judge, In re LabMD 
Inc., F.T.C. No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033, at *36–37 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2015) (citing Order 
Denying Respondent LabMD’s Motion to Dismiss at 5, LabMD, F.T.C. No. 9357 (F.T.C. Jan. 
16, 2014) (refusing to revisit issue of FTC’s jurisdiction in initial decision), vacated, F.T.C. No. 
9357, 2016 WL 4128215 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016) [hereinafter LabMD Initial Decision].  The 
FTC predictably vacated the ALJ’s initial finding.  See LabMD Inc., 2016 WL 4128215, at *32.  
While the ALJ determined that a disclosure resulting in a mere risk of harm to consumers was 
not sufficient to support a finding of unfairness, the FTC ruled that the disclosure alone 
represented sufficient consumer harm.  See id. at *8 (opining that disclosure of medical 
information, while intangible, is “very real harm”).  The FTC cited Wyndham for the proposition 
that the fact that a “‘company’s conduct was not the most proximate cause of an injury generally 
does not immunize liability from foreseeable harms.’”  See id. at *9 (emphasis added) (quoting 
F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2015)).  However, by relying 
on the Wyndham holding in its LabMD order, the FTC failed to distinguish between two 
drastically different factual scenarios and companies.  See infra notes 119–26 and 
accompanying text. 
91.  See LabMD Initial Decision, 2015 WL 7575033, at *87 (noting “evidence fails to 
prove that Respondent’s alleged unreasonable data security caused, or is likely to cause, 
substantial injury to consumers”). 
92.  See id., at *14 (“Fundamental fairness dictates that demonstrating actual or likely 
substantial consumer injury under Section 5(n) requires proof of more than the hypothetical or 
theoretical harm . . . .”). 
93.  See Conner, supra note 87 (quoting LabMD’s former CEO). 
94.  See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(discussing nature of Wyndham’s business). 
95.  See id. (explaining Wyndham’s corporate structure and certain requirements for its 
properties).  Information collected and maintained by these systems “includes [customer] 
names, home addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, payment card account numbers, 
expiration dates, and security codes.”  See id. 
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specifications.96  Additionally, Wyndham controls a central computer network in 
Phoenix, Arizona “that connects . . . with all of the property management systems 
of each of the Wyndham-branded hotels.”97  Between April 2008 and December 
2009, Wyndham’s computer system was hacked three times.98  As a result, the 
personal and financial information of approximately 619,000 consumers was 
stolen, leading to “at least $10.6 million in fraud loss.”99 
The FTC filed a complaint against Wyndham in June 2012, claiming “that 
Wyndham’s conduct was an unfair practice and that its [advertised] privacy 
policy was deceptive.”100  The United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey denied Wyndham’s motion to dismiss both claims.101  However, the 
district court “certified its decision on the unfairness claim for interlocutory 
appeal.”102  Therefore, the Third Circuit was limited to considering whether the 
FTC has jurisdiction to regulate data security under the unfairness prong of 
section 45(a) of the FTCA and, if so, whether Wyndham had fair notice of its data 
 
96.  See id. (referring to information provided in complaint and discussing Wyndham’s 
computer network infrastructure).  
97.  See id. (explaining connectivity of Wyndham’s many property management 
systems). 
98.  See id.  The first attack allegedly occurred in April 2008.  See id. at 241.  Hackers 
broke into the local network of a hotel in Phoenix by “repeatedly guessing users’ login [names] 
and passwords.”  See id. at 242.  The hackers gained “access to an administrator account.”  See 
id.  Next, the hackers stole “unencrypted information for over 500,000 accounts, which they 
sent to a domain in Russia.”  See id.  The second attack occurred in March 2009 when hackers 
“accessed Wyndham’s network through an administrative account.”  See id.  According to the 
FTC, “Wyndham was unaware of the attack for two months until consumers filed complaints 
about fraudulent charges.”  See id.  “[U]nencrypted payment card information for approximately 
50,000 customers [was stolen] from the property management systems of [thirty-nine] branded 
hotels.”  See id.  Afterwards, Wyndham found the same “memory-scraping malware used in the 
previous attack on more than thirty hotels’ computer systems.”  See id.  Finally, at the end of 
2009, hackers accessed another administrator’s account, and the “payment card information for 
approximately 69,000 customers from the property management systems of [twenty-eighty] 
hotels” was stolen.  See id.  Further, Wyndham was unaware of this attack until January 2010, 
“when a credit card company received complaints [about fraudulent charges] from 
cardholders.”  See id. 
99.  See id. at 240–42 (discussing harm to consumers due to Wyndham’s multiple 
breaches). 
100.  See id. at 240 (stating reasoning for FTC’s complaint).  The FTC’s complaint 
contained seven primary claims: (1) Wyndham maintained payment card information in “clear 
readable text” files; (2) “Wyndham allowed the use of easily guessed passwords to access the 
property management systems”; (3) “Wyndham failed to use readily available security 
measures—such as firewalls—to limit [network] access”; “(4) “Wyndham allowed hotel 
property management systems to connect to its [main] network [in Phoenix] without taking 
appropriate cybersecurity precautions”; (5) Wyndham did not “[properly] restrict the [network] 
access of third-party vendors”; (6) Wyndham “failed to [use] reasonable measures to detect and 
prevent unauthorized [network] access”; and (7) Wyndham “did not follow proper incident 
response procedures.”  See id. at 240–41 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing FTC 
Complaint). 
101.  See id. at 240, 242 (noting district court’s denial of motion to dismiss).  The FTC 
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, but Wyndham 
successfully requested the case be transferred to the District of New Jersey.  See id. at 242. 
102.  See id. at 242 (explaining procedural history in district court). 
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 6 [2017], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss6/5
2016] CASEBRIEF 87 
security obligations.103 
B. The Third Circuit Breaks Through Wyndham’s Weak Arguments 
The Third Circuit ruled against Wyndham on both issues.104  According to 
Wyndham, the word “unfair” added additional requirements to the agency’s 
three-part test, such as “unethical behavior.”105  The Third Circuit disagreed 
because the idea that a company’s behavior must be “unscrupulous” or 
“unethical” to be unfair, even though unfair practices may be unethical, has long 
been rejected.106  Having determined that Wyndham’s data security practices fell 
within the purview of the FTCA, the Third Circuit applied the three-part 
unfairness test to Wyndham’s data breach.107  The court found significant and 
quantifiable consumer injury in the form of $10.6 million suffered by Wyndham 
customers due to fraudulent charges from the breaches.108  Moreover, the court 
reasoned that because Wyndham had advertised data security measures on par 
with industry standards, customers were deceived and could not avoid losing their 
personal information.109  Lastly, one should note that, given Wyndham’s size and 
multiple data breaches, improving safeguards would not have presented 
countervailing burdens to consumers or the business that outweighed the benefits 
of better data security practices.110 
Next, the Third Circuit held that Wyndham was not owed “ascertainable 
certainty” of the FTC’s position on what data security measures “are required by 
[section] 45(a)” of the FTCA.111  In the absence of an FTC regulation, the court 
 
103.  See Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 240 (noting issues under consideration).  The deceptive 
practices claim alleged that, since 2008, Wyndham had overstated its cybersecurity practices in 
its privacy policy.  See id. at 241.  “[C]ontrary to this policy, Wyndham did not use encryption, 
firewalls, or other commercially reasonable methods for protecting consumer data,” according 
to the FTC.  See id. 
104.  See id. at 259 (“We thus affirm the District Court’s decision.”). 
105.  See id. at 244–45 (explaining Wyndham’s unsuccessful argument). 
106.  See id. (discussing prior cases that examined unfair conduct).  Furthermore, 
Wyndham attempted to define an unfair practice as one that is “not equitable” or is “marked by 
injustice, partiality, or deception.”  See id. at 245.  The Third Circuit reasoned that whether these 
are additional requirements was irrelevant in this case.  See id. (“A company does not act 
equitably when it publishes a privacy policy to attract customers who are concerned about data 
privacy, fails to make good on that promise by investing inadequate resources in cybersecurity, 
exposes its unsuspecting customers to substantial financial injury, and retains the profits of their 
business.”). 
107.  See id. at 244–47 (holding Wyndham’s conduct does not fall outside of accepted 
notion of unfair practices). 
108.  See id. at 240, 242 (discussing consumer injury due to Wyndham’s multiple 
breaches). 
109.  See id. at 241 (“We safeguard our [c]ustomers’ personally identifiable information 
by using industry standard practices.” (quoting Wyndham’s advertised privacy policy)). 
110.  See Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, Annual Report (Form 10-K), SEC 35–36 
(2013), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1361658/000136165814000005/wyn-
20131231x10k.htm [https://perma.cc/lb9e-5qdq] (disclosing Wyndham’s total assets for fiscal 
year ending December 2013).  Wyndham’s total assets for the fiscal year ending December 31, 
2013, were approximately $9.74 billion.  See id.  Its revenue topped $5 billion.  See id.  
111.  See Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 252 (rejecting Wyndham’s request for “ascertainable 
certainty” standard). 
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decided that “this case involve[d] ordinary judicial interpretation of a civil 
statute,” the FTCA.112  Therefore, the “ascertainable certainty” standard, which 
the Third Circuit applies only to an agency’s interpretation of its organic statute 
or own regulations, was inapplicable.113  The relevant question for the court was 
whether section 45(a) was so vague as to give Wyndham no expectation that its 
conduct might be a violation.114  The court reasoned that “[f]air notice is satisfied 
here as long as [Wyndham] could reasonably foresee that a court could construe 
its conduct as falling within the meaning of the [FTCA].”115  The court 
acknowledged that the three-part unfairness test is “far from” an exact standard 
but held that Wyndham was at least aware that it should have undertaken a cost-
benefit analysis pursuant to the third requirement of the FTC’s unfairness test.116  
According to the court, it should have been “painfully clear to Wyndham that a 
court could find that its conduct failed the cost-benefit analysis” in choosing not 
to respond to known threats after Wyndham’s second data breach.117  
Furthermore, the court noted that the FTC’s 2007 guidebook described a 
“checklist of [best] practices” for “sound data security plan[s],” which warns 
against many practices undertaken by Wyndham in this case.118 
C. Unfair Data Security Power in Beta: FTC & Consumers Win Because The 
Third Circuit Keeps Onus on Businesses to Adapt to New Threats 
The Wyndham holding is not the unfettered grant of unfair data security 
power that many claim it to be.119  The Third Circuit’s opinion, along with a 
comparison to the initial decision in LabMD, shows that the agency will be 
tethered to its three-part test for unfair practices in the future.120  The court’s 
 
112.  See id. at 253 (“[I]f the federal courts are to decide whether Wyndham’s conduct 
was unfair in the first instance under the statute without deferring to any FTC interpretation, 
then this case involves ordinary judicial interpretation of a civil statute, and the ascertainable 
certainty standard does not apply.”). 
113.  See id. (explaining when “ascertainable certainty” standard applies).  This point was 
raised by Wyndham, as well, several times in the case.  See id.  Wyndham necessarily argued 
that the federal courts, rather than the agency, are to interpret section 45(a) in the first instance.  
See id. at 259. 
114.  See id. at 253–54 (explaining legal question). 
115.  See id. at 256 (emphasis added) (discussing considerations Wyndham should have 
been concerned with prior to breach). 
116.  See id. at 255 (citing Pa. Funeral Dirs. Ass’n v. FTC, 41 F.3d 81, 89–92 (3d Cir. 
1994)) (stating Wyndham should have engaged in cost-benefit analysis of improved data 
security practices). 
117.  See id. at 256 (stating Wyndham had fair notice after second data breach). 
118.  See id. (noting Wyndham could have consulted FTC’s guidebook). 
119.  See Brian Roux, Understanding the Implications of F.T.C. v. Wyndham on Data 
Security Practices, HANGARTNER RYDBERG & TERRELL LLC (Sept. 11, 2015), 
http://hanrylaw.com/2015/09/11/understanding-the-implications-of-ftc-v-wyndham-on-data-
security-practices [https://perma.cc/235m-gh9s] (stating Wyndham stands for proposition that 
FTC already had data security authority under FTCA but might now be “unfettered by a 
company having made a deceptive promise”). 
120.  See Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 243–44 (stating three-part test for unfairness and 
asserting not all consumer injuries lead to unfairness finding); cf. Initial Decision by D. Michael 
Chappell, Chief Admin. Law Judge, In re LabMD Inc., F.T.C. No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033, at 
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determination that the “vagueness” standard applies, rather than the 
“ascertainable certainty” standard, is far more consequential and represents a 
positive outcome for consumers, as well as the FTC.121 
1. Comparing Older Models: Wyndham Compares Unfavorably to Previous 
Enforcement Actions 
The Third Circuit was able to avoid a discussion about how to regulate data 
security practices best because the facts were so overwhelmingly in the FTC’s 
favor.122  A comparison of BJ’s and the initial decision from LabMD is 
instructive.123  Given the quantifiable harm to consumers and glaring warning 
signs, Wyndham is much more like BJ’s than LabMD.124  Moreover, after several 
data breaches, Wyndham’s data security practices presented more than a “mere 
risk” of consumer injury.125  Wyndham’s unfair data security practices caused 
actual consumer injury in the form of more than $10 million.126 
2. The Third Circuit Installs Vagueness Standard for FTC’s Data Security 
Enforcement Actions 
 The Third Circuit’s application of the “vagueness” standard will enable the 
FTC to battle cyber threats effectively.127  The opposite result would require the 
FTC to engage in notice and comment rulemaking before continuing unfair data 
security enforcement actions.128  This process would be untenable because 
 
*37 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2015) (citing Order Denying Respondent LabMD’s Motion to Dismiss at 
5, LabMD, F.T.C. No. 9357 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014)) (refusing to revisit issue of FTC’s 
jurisdiction in initial decision), vacated, F.T.C. No. 9357, 2016 WL 4128215 (F.T.C. July 28, 
2016). 
121.  See Recent Cases, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.: Third Circuit Finds FTC 
Has Authority to Regulate Data Security and Company Had Fair Notice of Potential Liability, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 1120 (2016), http://harvardlawreview.org/2016/02/ftc-v-wyndham-
worldwide-corp [https://perma.cc/gq4k-yu34] (arguing vagueness standard allows FTC to adapt 
to new data security threats). 
122.  See id. (noting facts that weighed against Wyndham and in favor of FTC).   
123.  Compare Initial Decision by D. Michael Chappell, Chief Admin. Law Judge, 2015 
WL 7575033, at *37–38 (finding no evidence of anything more than “risk” posed by LabMD’s 
data security practices), with In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 467 (2005) 
(noting consumers lost millions of dollars due to fraudulent charges). 
124.  Compare Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 240 (noting consumers lost $10.6 million in 
fraudulent charges), with BJ’s Wholesale Club, 140 F.T.C. at 467 (noting fraudulent charges). 
125.  Compare Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 246 (“For good reason, Wyndham does not argue 
that the cybersecurity intrusions were unforeseeable.  That would be particularly implausible as 
to the second and third attacks.”), with Initial Decision by D. Michael Chappell, Chief Admin. 
Law Judge, 2015 WL 7575033, at *37–38 (finding no actual harm to consumers). 
126.  See Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 240 (noting consumers suffered $10.6 million in 
fraudulent charges). 
127.  See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.: Third Circuit Finds FTC Has Authority 
to Regulate Data Security and Company Had Fair Notice of Potential Liability, supra note 121 
(noting vagueness standard will allow FTC to adapt to new data security threats). 
128.  See id. (noting ascertainable certainty standard implies FTC would undertake 
rulemaking). 
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cybersecurity threats and business practices are constantly changing.129  Specific 
compliance-based data security regulations would, in all likelihood, become 
obsolete shortly after passage.130  Such a scenario would place no responsibility 
on businesses to improve their practices and would expose consumers’ sensitive 
information to new modes of attack.131  On the other hand, the FTC could 
promulgate data security regulations with the requisite flexibility, but they would 
be susceptible to the same fair notice challenges as the agency’s current 
framework.132 
 As mentioned, this case presented an easy win for the FTC.133  What would 
have happened if Wyndham had, on its own, made improvements to its data 
security practices after the initial breach, but stopped short of a comprehensive 
program due to its other operational interests?134  Furthermore, what if the FTC 
disagreed with Wyndham’s internal cost-benefit analysis in such a scenario?135  
Herein lies the tension created by the Wyndham holding: the FTCA and the FTC’s 
guidance and enforcement actions give adequate notice to companies with 
egregiously unfair practices, like BJ’s or Wyndham’s, but not necessarily for 
companies with stringent, but not comprehensive measures.136  A future court will 
 
129.  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 624 (noting FTC’s guidance on data 
security has been consistent). 
130.  See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.: Third Circuit Finds FTC Has Authority 
to Regulate Data Security and Company Had Fair Notice of Potential Liability, supra note 121 
(noting cybersecurity threats and business practices are always changing). 
131.  See Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1409, 1447 (2011) (“[The] combination of strategic enforcement and agency guidelines 
developed in collaboration with industry demonstrates the FTC’s ‘ability to respond to harmful 
outcomes by enforcing evolving standards of privacy protection’ in keeping with changes in 
‘the market, technology, and consumer expectations.’” (quoting Bamberger & Mulligan, supra 
note 9, at 128–29)). 
132.  See id. at 1453 (discussing effects of flexible approach taken by FTC toward data 
security regulation); FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.: Third Circuit Finds FTC Has 
Authority to Regulate Data Security and Company Had Fair Notice of Potential Liability, supra 
note 121 (noting uniform privacy regulations would “necessarily be [] vague” and be open to 
same fair notice attacks as enforcement actions); see also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 
625 (describing FTC approach as adaptable). 
133.  See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.: Third Circuit Finds FTC Has Authority 
to Regulate Data Security and Company Had Fair Notice of Potential Liability, supra note 121 
(noting facts in favor of FTC); Roux, supra note 119 (“[T]he alleged facts [were] so terribly 
against Wyndham.”); Straight, supra note 76 (listing nine key data security practices that 
weighed against Wyndham). 
134.  See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.: Third Circuit Finds FTC Has Authority 
to Regulate Data Security and Company Had Fair Notice of Potential Liability, supra note 121 
(asking how future courts will rule in borderline cases); Roux, supra note 119 (noting 
implications of Wyndham are “not specific to companies of any particular size”); see also 
Straight, supra note 76 (stating companies must pay closer attention to data security practices).  
135.  See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.: Third Circuit Finds FTC Has Authority 
to Regulate Data Security and Company Had Fair Notice of Potential Liability, supra note 121 
(questioning how courts will rule under certain circumstances); Roux, supra note 119 (“The 
nuances of where the dividing line is for these issues were not discussed in this decision . . . .”). 
136.  See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.: Third Circuit Finds FTC Has Authority 
to Regulate Data Security and Company Had Fair Notice of Potential Liability, supra note 121 
(asking how future courts will treat fair notice when company seemingly satisfies many data 
security practices requirements but still incurs FTC scrutiny); Edwards, supra note 20 (quoting 
20
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need to decide how the agency can enforce unfair data security practices while 
providing adequate notice to companies who are either financially unable to 
implement thorough practices or choose not to as a result of their own cost-benefit 
analyses.137 
IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT UPGRADES OBLIGATIONS: WYNDHAM HOLDING PUTS 
PRESSURE ON SMALL BUSINESSES IN NEW ERA OF “COMPLIANCE-PLUS” 
Small to mid-sized companies are handling more and more sensitive 
information and often lack the resources they need to protect it.138  The FTC has 
indicated that these companies will not “get a pass” when substantial consumer 
injury occurs.139  This fact should set off alarms for businesses operating in the 
Third Circuit; “Losing [customers’ confidence] due to a data breach” may mean 
life or death for a small business struggling to “keep[] the lights on.”140  The 
FTC’s current posture suggests that small companies will be responsible for 
keeping pace with new forms of cyber threats, even when they are already doing 
what they can to secure personal information.141  Thankfully, there are several 
steps smaller businesses and their legal counsel or compliance officers can take 
in pursuit of compliance with FTC data security standards.142 
First and foremost, every company dealing with consumer information 
should incorporate data security into part of its technical and business strategy.143  
 
Marc Roth, partner at Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP) (noting that small companies may lack 
resources to comply with all of FTC’s recommendations for data security programs). 
137.  See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.: Third Circuit Finds FTC Has Authority 
to Regulate Data Security and Company Had Fair Notice of Potential Liability, supra note 121 
(suggesting issue will need to be determined by future court). 
138.  See Julie Brill, Fed. Trade Comm’r, Keynote Address, Do Try This at Home: 
Starting Up with Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 9, 2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/915043/160208swsseattle.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2n5c-2vqf] (noting small businesses are collecting more and more sensitive 
information). 
139.  See id. (“Small companies can also get big very quickly.  Neither new technologies 
nor small companies get a pass under the FTC Act.”).  The FTC’s attitude should be cause for 
concern for smaller companies that do not have the resources to comply with the most stringent 
agency expectations.  See Edwards, supra note 20 (quoting Marc Roth, partner at Manatt, Phelps 
& Phillips, LLP) (“For a small company, [compliance is] a challenge.”). 
140.  See John Breyault, Bravo! FTC’s “Start with Security” Initiative Announces 
Seminar on Data Security, NAT’L CONSUMERS LEAGUE (May 2015), 
http://www.nclnet.org/start_with_security [https://perma.cc/l5w3-lh9j] (noting approximately 
six out of ten consumers lose confidence in businesses after data breach). 
141.  See Edwards, supra note 20 (“If a company does what [it] can to protect data and 
gets hacked, should [it] have known that there’s a new virus out there, or some type of intrusion 
device?  It might be difficult for [it] to know that.  But the FTC might bring a case.” (quoting 
Marc Roth, partner at Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
142.  See Sargent, supra note 39, at 542 (suggesting multiple “non-governmental 
sources” to use when discerning reasonableness of data security protocols). 
143.  See Mann et al., supra note 3, at 14 (noting importance of companies incorporating 
data security into business strategies).  The authors argue that companies cannot leave I.T. 
professionals to deal with security problems on their own anymore.  See id.  In addition to 
having proper security networks, companies should implement “policies and practices that 
include[] training employees to identify [threats].”  See id. at 15.  Illustrative of this point is the 
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Businesses should start by undertaking a cost-benefit analysis, similar to the one 
discussed in Wyndham.144  This analysis will entail evaluating the size and 
complexity of the company, the nature of the business, and the sensitivity of the 
information procured.145  These determinations will vary by business, but 
programs such as those outlined by unfair data security enforcement settlements 
or the GLB will help weave data security into a company’s strategic business 
plan.146  Small businesses will not always be able to put in place such 
comprehensive programs, but might mitigate FTC scrutiny by doing so to the 
extent it is financially feasible.147 
One thing all companies should do is consult the recommended security 
protocol developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.148  
This basic framework for cybersecurity “is becoming a de facto standard” for 
government regulation of data protection.149  It pulls together data security 
developments in a variety of industries so that businesses do not have to.150  The 
 
2013 Target data breach.  See id.  The attack was just as much a result of an outside security 
vendor’s own lack of a protection-minded “culture” as it was Target’s “technical security 
failures.”  See id. at 13.  Moreover, while I.T. professionals have a role to play in implementing 
such procedures, that role should be one part of a “culture of data security diligence.”  See id. 
at 14; Roux, supra note 119 (“It is clear that businesses must be proactive with their 
cybersecurity practices, forearm themselves with legally defensible procedures for dealing with 
the aftermath of an incident, and carefully consider their legal responsibilities . . . .”). 
144.  See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 255 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 
Pa. Funeral Dirs. Ass’n v. FTC, 41 F.3d 81, 89–92 (3d Cir. 1994)) (discussing flexible cost-
benefit analysis that weighs consumer and business interests). 
145.  See Cybersecurity and Consumer Data Hearing, supra note 62, at 8 (noting key 
factors in crafting data security strategies); cf. In re Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 149 F.T.C. 1449 
(2010) (outlining FTC investigation of Dave & Buster’s and ordering changes to data security 
practices); DSW Inc., F.T.C. No. C-4157, 2006 WL 752215 (F.T.C. Mar. 7, 2006). 
146.  See Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 501(b), 113 Stat. 1338, 1436–37 (1999) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012)); see also FTC Enforcement Actions, supra note 10 (noting importance 
of making security part of business’s service); cf. Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 149 F.T.C. 1449 
(2010); DSW Inc., F.T.C. No. C-4157, 2006 WL 752215 (F.T.C. Mar. 7, 2006). 
147.  See Richard Raysman & Francesca Morris, What CIOs Need to Know About the 
FTC Cybersecurity Ruling, W.S.J. (Aug. 31, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/08/31/what-
cios-need-to-know-about-the-ftc-cybersecurity-ruling [https://perma.cc/xay3-fruj] (stating 
companies that attempt to implement cybersecurity framework may “persuade the FTC that 
there are no grounds to file a complaint”). 
148.  See id. (claiming NIST framework will satisfy many FTC standards); see also 
generally Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS & TECH. (Feb. 12, 2014), 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-
021214.pdf [https://perma.cc/v8ly-5s88] (providing steps companies of every size can take to 
ensure compliance with FTC data security expectations). 
149.  See Raysman & Morris, supra note 147 (explaining framework “is becoming” 
government’s preferred standard for cybersecurity). 
150.  See Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, supra note 
148, at 4 (“By relying on those global standards, guidelines, and practices developed, managed, 
and updated by industry, the tools and methods available to achieve the Framework outcomes 
will scale across borders, acknowledge the global nature of cybersecurity risks, and evolve with 
technological advances and business requirements.”). 
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most recent update to the framework was made in 2014.151  It accounts for a 
company’s “risk tolerances[] and resources,” while also considering what 
competitors in the industry are doing.152  Using this protocol as a guide will show 
the FTC that an organization is attempting to keep pace with industry standards 
and respond to potential threats.153 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the standards for protecting consumer information appear to be 
amorphous, one thing is clear: documenting cybersecurity updates and attempts 
to keep pace with industry standards is of the utmost importance.154  The ability 
to show that a company has made reasonable attempts at preventing breaches will 
go far to dissuade FTC enforcement.155  Even the FTC concedes that no amount 
of spending will ensure complete data security.156  However, providing evidence 
that a company has made data security a priority should help to mitigate FTC 
scrutiny.157 
 
151.  See id. at 2 (“The Framework . . . will continue to be updated and improved as 
industry provides feedback on implementation . . . .  [L]essons learned will be integrated into 
future versions.  This will ensure it is meeting the needs of critical infrastructure owners and 
operators in a dynamic and challenging environment of new threats, risks, and solutions.”).  In 
fact, the framework has already been updated since 2014, highlighting the pressure on 
businesses to keep pace with a rapidly evolving field.  See generally Framework for Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/Cybersecurity-
Framework-for-FCSM-Jan-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/p8zl-ncgd]. 
152.  See Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, supra note 
148, at 1, 4 (explaining continuous update to framework by industry). 
153.  See Raysman & Morris, supra note 147 (noting compliance efforts will possibly 
“dissuade the FTC from taking action”). 
154.  See id. (“In addition to actually having in place the most up-to-date practical anti-
hacking software, a company needs to be able to demonstrate the way in which it has protected 
private customer information in order to dissuade the FTC from taking action, and to protect its 
officers and directors . . . .”). 
155.  See id. (suggesting companies may “dissuade” FTC from filing complaint by 
employing measures such as those suggested by NIST framework). 
156.  See Cybersecurity and Consumer Data Hearing, supra note 62, at 14 (stating 
companies with stringent data security practices may still suffer breaches). 
157.  See Raysman & Morris, supra note 147 (“[A] company needs to be able to 
demonstrate the way in which it has protected private customer information in order to dissuade 
the FTC from taking action, and to protect its officers and directors from class action lawsuits 
following an FTC complaint.”). 
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